SC ST Reservation Percentage in India: A Complete Data Guide

Context and question

“SC ST Reservation Percentage in India: A Complete Data Guide” sits in the governance strand of the Reservation Hatao Andolan official research library. The question it opens with is deliberately narrow: does the policy in view still deliver what it was designed to deliver, and can that be demonstrated with published records rather than asserted from memory? Most public argument on reservation collapses because the two sides are not measuring the same thing. This paper fixes the measure first and only then reads the evidence.

This data guide compiles the current reservation percentages for SC, ST, OBC, and EWS categories in central government jobs, central educational institutions, and major state-level variations — with a note on unfilled vacancies and creamy-layer capture.

Method and evidence base

Method. The paper works only from material any reader can obtain: parliamentary answers, commission and committee reports, judgments, university and public-sector disclosures, RTI replies and census or survey microdata. Public Data Cell, RHA compiled the file and dated it 27 July 2026; the reading time of roughly 7 min reflects the length of the argument, not the length of the dataset behind it.

SC, ST, OBC and EWS reservation percentages in central jobs, educational institutions, and state-level variations.

The findings, read one by one

Central government quota: 15% SC, 7.5% ST, 27% OBC, 10% EWS. This is the point at which the debate usually shifts from evidence to identity. It should not. The finding says nothing about the worth of any community and everything about whether the delivery mechanism reaches the household that has none of the advantages the category tag was meant to stand in for.

States like Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra exceed the 50% Indra Sawhney ceiling. The important part is the direction of travel rather than the absolute figure. It has not corrected itself across successive review periods. A remedy that does not close the gap it was written to close is no longer a remedy; it is an inherited administrative habit.

Percentages do not guarantee outcomes when posts and seats remain unfilled. On its own that reads like a governance technicality. Set against the stated purpose of the provision, it is the whole argument — a corrective that was meant to be time-bound has become the permanent shape of the system, and no review cycle has been asked to justify it against outcomes.

The strongest objection

The strongest objection to this paper is that caste disadvantage is social as well as economic, and that an income test cannot capture humiliation, exclusion or the absence of networks. That objection is serious and the movement accepts it. The response is not to deny the social dimension but to measure it directly — first-generation-learner status, school quality, district development, parental occupation and household assets are all recordable, and together they capture far more of real disadvantage than a surname does.

What the paper asks for

What follows from this. The governance record supports a reform that is administrative before it is political — measure need directly, apply it uniformly, and let the resulting allocation fall where it falls. A citizen from any community whose household is genuinely deprived would gain, not lose, under that arrangement.

Limits, corrections and reuse

Limits. This is civic research and commentary published for public education under Article 19(1)(a); it is not legal advice and it advocates only lawful, non-violent, constitutional change. The record on governance is incomplete in places, and the paper marks those gaps rather than estimating across them. Corrections with a source are published with credit.